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THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN MISSISSIPPI:
PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE
Lias v. State, 362 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1978).
Sometime during the evening of February 17, 1974, or the early
morning of February 18, 1974, Frankie Lee Lias shot and killed seven
people and wounded an eighth.' He was tried for the murders of four
of his victims. 2 His defense was insanity.3  A psychiatrist from the
Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield testified that Lias was a
paranoid schizophrenic and incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong at the time of the killings." It was stipulated that another
psychiatrist with the hospital would have given the same testimony. s
Certain lay testimony was offered which indicated that Lias might
have been insane and unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
acts.' Lay testimony for the state indicated that Lias did know the
nature and consequences of his acts7 but the prosecution produced no
lay or expert testimony directly concerning Lias' ability to distinguish
right from wrong.8 A long, rambling "confession" which made no
reference to the killings was admitted.'
Due to daily medication Lias at the time of the trial was in a state
of remission and was not dangerous. Yet without the medication Lias
might commit further acts of violence. The Mississippi Code provides
for commitment of a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity if the
jury certifies that the defendant is insane and dangerous.' 0 No code
provision or case law provides for the commitment of a defendant
'Lias v. State, 362 So. 2d 198, 199 (Miss. 1978).




'Id. Lias called himself Black Moses and claimed to be able to communicate with
God. On the night of the killings he told his brother, "The Lord told me to come to him
and bring all those around me."
'Id. at 199, 200. Lias told his brother he had "blooded" the community with his ri-
fle. He told an acquaintance that he had, had trouble with his family, in-laws, and
neighbors and had killed everyone except one Francesca.
'Id. at 199, 201. A medical doctor testified that Lias appeared "solemn and
remorseful" when seen in the jail a day or two after the killings. His brother testified
that Lias knew the meaning of sin.
'Id. at 200. See also Harvey v. State, 207 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 1968).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-13-7 (1972).
When any person shall be indicted for an offense and acquitted on the ground of
insanity the jury rendering the verdict shall state therein such ground and
whether the accused have since been restored to his reason, and whether he be
dangerous to the community. And if the jury certify that such person is still in-
sane and dangerous the judge shall order him to be conveyed to and confined in
one of the state asylums for the insane.
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who is presently sane but potentially dangerous. ' The jury found the
defendant guilty, specially finding in writing that the defendant had
been sane at the time of the killings.' 2 The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, holding that it was not able to find the jury's
verdict arbitrary or against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence.' 3 Mr. Chief Justice Patterson was of the opinion that the
jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence
but concurred on the basis of the need for institutionalization of the
defendant because of his being a potential danger to the community. ',
As the Mississippi Supreme Court forcefully stated in Harvey v.
State,"s "All civilized society, from early antiquity has recognized
that in order to hold persons responsible for crime it was necessary for
such person to have sufficient mental understanding to form a
criminal intent.""' The law promises that those who act without
criminal intent, no matter how vile their actions, shall not be pun-
ished. The Lias case illustrates how empty that promise can be, at
least in certain circumstances. The supreme court plainly failed to
apply the law as it exists. Further, the "luck" of this defendant in
having been restored to his sanity prior to his trial points out serious
new problems and inadequacies in the law that should be dealt with
promptly by the legislature or the supreme court.
In Mississippi under the M'Naghten rule an accused is criminally
responsible for his actions if among other things he is able to
distinguish between right and wrong.' 7 The Mississippi Supreme
Court, rejecting the practice of some other jurisdictions, 8 placed the
burden of proof on the issue of insanity on the prosecution. The rule
has remained unchanged since announced in 1879 in Cunningham v.
State.
20
Every man is presumed to be sane and in the absence of testimony
engendering a reasonable doubt of sanity, no evidence on the subject
need be offered; but whenever the question of sanity is raised and put
in issue by such facts, proven on either side as engender such doubt, it
devolves upon the [sitate to remove it and to establish the sanity of the
'362 So. 2d 198, 202 (1978) (Patterson, C. J., specially concurring).
2Id. at 201.
13Id.
"Id. at 202, 203.
"207 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 1968).
"Id. at 110.
"Johnson v. State, 223 Miss. 56, 76 So. 2d 841 (1955).
"Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 274, 31 Am. Rep. 360, 362 (1879). The court
rejected the notion that a defendant must prove his insanity either by a preponderance





prisoner to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond all reasonable doubt
arising out of all evidence in the case.2
Unless the state proves the defendant's sanity beyond all reasonable
doubt the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
2
It was uncontested that the defense in the instant case had pro-
duced sufficient evidence according to the test in Waycaster v. State"
to place the defendant's sanity in issue and place the burden of proof
on the prosecution." The Mississippi Supreme Court was asked to
reverse Lias' conviction on the grounds that the state had failed to sus-
tain its burden of proof.
Recognizing that a jury may miscarry its duties, the Mississippi
Supreme Court will overturn convictions for insufficiency of
evidence. Two rules of law tend to restrict reversals to the most ex-
treme cases." First, the court must accept as credible all evidence
supporting the jury's verdict. 28 The likelihood of a reversal is further
reduced by the court's use of a standard in reviewing convictions
which is inconsistent with the standard required for conviction in the
first instance.
2 7
In Mississippi a jury verdict in a criminal case will not be dis-
turbed unless it is clear that the "verdict is the result of bias, passion,
or prejudice, or is manifestly against the overwhelming weight of
credible evidence."- 28 The majority opinion recited the facts and
refused to overturn Lias' conviction because it was not "unsupported
by the facts.' '2 The Lias case illustrates vividly that very little
evidence is required to support a conviction. The Lias case further in-
dicates that the stated standard by which cases are reviewed may be
2"Id. at 276, 31 Am. Rep. at 365. Cf. Pollard v. State, 53 Miss. 410 (1876) (burden
of proof were alibi is the defense).
2256 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360 (1879).
23185 Miss. 25, 187 So. 205 (1939).
2
41d. at 36, 187 So. at 207. "[Tlhe test should be whether the acts and conduct of the
accused, and the opinions of the witnesses on the issue of his sanity would reasonably be
calculated to raise such [reasonablel doubt in the mind of the jurors." Id.
23See generally Holloway v. State 312 So. 2d 700 (Miss. 1975); Gambrell v. State
238 Miss. 892, 120 So. 2d 758 (1960).
26Campbell v. State, 278 So. 2d 420 (Miss. 1973); McClelland v. State, 204 So. 2d
158 (Miss. 1967); Scott v. State, 185 Miss. 454, 188 So. 546 (1939).
27Guilt, including the defendant's sanity, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
to convict. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360. A conviction will not
be reversed unless the verdict is manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the
credible evidence. Campbell v. State, 278 So. 2d at 423 (Miss. 1973).
"8Simmons v. State, 301 So. 2d 565, 568 (Miss. 1974). But cf. Nagell v. United
States, 392 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1968) (a jury verdict should be overturned if a reasonable
mind must have had a reasonable doubt.)
"°362 So. 2d at 201. This language does not express the proper test for the courts in
weighing jury verdicts. This language appears to be dicta but its presence in the opi-
nion makes it unclear exactly what standard the court did use.
1979]
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stronger than the standard by which the court, guided by practical
considerations actually judges jury verdicts. An examination of two
cases in which the Mississippi Supreme Court has overturned the
jury's determination of a defendant's sanity and a comparison of
those two cases with the present case is instructive.
In Gambrell v. State30 and Holloway v. State3 convictions were
reversed because the state's evidence was not sufficient to support a
finding by the jury of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Gambrell,
Holloway, and Lias were all diagnosed to be suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia.32  Holloway was charged with assault and battery
with intent to kill.33 Gambrell and Lias were charged with murder.
3
1
Robert Holloway was committed to the Mississippi State Hospital
at Whitfield and his mental condition diagnosed before the assaults
with which he was charged occurred.3" The assaults occurred when
Holloway was released while supposedly in a state of remission."6 The
medical testimony on Holloway's mental state was "convincing and
unequivocal," 37 as was the medical testimony in Lias.'8 Holloway
was confined from 1963 until 1973 before being brought to trial.
3
1
Lias received treatment for nearly three years before being brought
to trial."0 If as the court clearly stated, Holloway's ten year commit-
ment was not conclusive on the issue of his sanity, the length of Lias'
commitment was not conclusive either. But as in Holloway's case, the
jury's finding of sanity is an ending "not untinged with irony."'"
In the Gambrell case extensive lay testimony and documents
established the fact that the defendant suffered from various delu-
11238 Miss. 892, 120 So. 2d 758 (1960).
1312 So. 2d 700 (Miss. 1975).
32238 Miss. at 900, 120 So. 2d at 761 (Gambrell); 312 So. 2d at 701 (Holloway); 362
So. 2d at 199 (Lias).
"312 So. 2d at 701.
"238 Miss. at 892, 120 So. 2d at 758.
11312 So. 2d at 701.
35Id.
"Id.
"362 So. 2d at 201, 202.
"312 So. 2d at 701.
"Record, vol. 1 at 16, vol. 2 at 177, Lias v. State, 362 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1978). Lias
was admitted to the state hospital in March 1974 and diagnosed by the staff in May
1974. His trial began in February 1977.
"Holloway v. State, 312 So. 2d at 702. Particularly ironic is the similarity of
language used by the court in reversing Holloway's conviction and affirming Lias' con-
viction. "While the question presented by the evidence is close indeed, we are unable to
say with complete confidence that Holloway's sanity at the time of the assault was
established sufficiently to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
sane." Id. "While admitting the closeness of the factual determination we also
acknowledge that such determination is the purpose for which juries exist. We are un-
willing on an appeal to overturn a jury determination unless such determination is un-
supported by the facts." Lias v. State, 362 So. 2d at 201.
[Vol. 1:213
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sions."I A private psychiatrist, acknowledged by the state to be an ex-
pert, testified 3 that he was absolutely of the opinion that Gambrell
was unable to distinguish right from wrong."' This psychiatrist's ex-
amination of the defendant had lasted for forty-five minutes to an
hour." The state introduced testimony of a Whitfield staff member
who stated that a period of two to four weeks was necessary for a
proper diagnosis of a patient's mental condition, 6 thereby calling in-
to question the validity of the testimony of the defense's expert
witness. Six lay witnesses testified for the state that the defendant ap-
peared normal and sane." The court in Gambrell held that the
[s]tate made what amounted to little more than a token effort to meet
the burden of proving appellant was sane .... Even when viewed in
the light most favorable to the [s]tate, it is our opinion that considera-
tion of the evidence will overwhelmingly convince any objective mind
that appellant was insane at the time of the killing.
48
The expert testimony in Lias appears even more convincing and it is
definitely not unfair to classify the state's effort to rebut the defend-
ant's evidence as token."
Why, given the similiarity of facts in Gambrell, Holloway and
Lias, did the supreme court affirm Lias' conviction? Perhaps one fac-
tor was the inadequacy of available verdicts discussed below in Part
Two. It seems worth noting that another possible reason for these two
reversals is the fact that it was "easy" for the court to reverse Gam-
brell's and Holloway's convictions. Holloway was confined for ten
years prior to trial.s He had in effect already done his time and im-
posing further sentence might seem unjust.5 In Gambrell two other
grounds for reversal existed, 2 and there seemed little likelihood of the
defendant being loosed on society. 3
In one way the Lias case may be distinguished from the other two.
"238 Miss. 892, 120 So. 2d 758 (1960).
"The psychiatrist's testimony was a reply to a lengthy hypothetical based on the
facts. Id. at 761.
"id.
.:Id.
"Id. This staff member offered no opinion as to the defendant's sanity and could not
say the diagnosis of the private psychiatrist was erroneous.
"Id. Like Lias, Gambrell at times carried on conversations and appeared rational
and coherent.
"8238 Miss. at 903, 120 So. 2d at 762-63.
"The state in this case did not even attempt an attack on the validity of the
psychiatrist's diagnosis as was done in Gambrell.
" 312 So. 2d at 701.
"Holloway was sentenced to two consecutive seven years sentences.
" 238 Miss. 892, 120 So. 2d 758. (Improper jury instruction implying acquittal by
reason of insanity would set defendant free). (Lower court erred in refusing to grant mo-
tion for new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence).
53The defense psychiatrist testified that the defendant was insane at the time of trial.
Id. at 900, 120 So. 2d at 761.
1979]
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The prosecution's theory, though backed by scanty evidence, sug-
gested a possibility that Lias might have been sane at the time of the
killings. Lias' confession indicated his knowledge of his wife's in-
fidelity, actual or imagined, which the state claimed was the motive
for the killings.5 4 The state also advanced the theory that the killings
had induced the insanity."5 On cross-examination the psychiatrist ad-
mitted this might be true."' The prosecution's evidence suggested a
possibility, not a probability, of sanity and fell far short of proving
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Gambrell's conviction was re-
versed because the court was convinced of his insanity.57 Perhaps
because Lias' insanity was not established beyond all doubt his con-
viction was upheld.
Since the jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of all
the evidence," the court's role in reviewing the evidence to determine
its sufficiency to support a conviction is properly a limited one. In
Lias' case the weight to be given expert testimony is crucial in deter-
mining the sufficiency of the evidence against him.
As the supreme court has stated repeatedly, the testimony of ex-
perts on insanity is not conclusive upon the jury, but rather
advisory."9 Several reasons have been advanced for not forcing juries
to defer to the judgment of experts. One reason for allowing the jury
to freely decide the weight to be given the opinion testimony of experts
is the fear that an expert might be deceived by one feigning insanity."0
Further, the weight to be given expert testimony may be lessened as in
McGarrh v. State"' by the possibility that an improper case history
might influence the expert's finding.
The court in Herron v. State12 recognized that the conclusions of
"362 So. 2d at 201.
"Id.
SId.
"238 Miss. at 903, 120 So. 2d at 763.
"Campbell v. State, 278 So. 2d 420 (1973).
"Smith v. State, 245 So. 2d 583 (Miss. 1971).
"Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741 (1881).
How much weight is to be given to the opinion of a witness on the question of
insanity depends, like the weight to be given all other opinions, upon the in-
telligence of the witness and his opportunities of observation; and while the
testimony of a professional man, with equal opportunities would ordinarily be
more reliable than that of a non-professional, the testimony of an intelligent
friend who had known the subject of the inquiry for years, might be more
weighty than that of the most experienced expert who had seen him only since
the condition of his intellect had become a matter of investigation. Craft and
deceit might mislead the one into an error which the lifetime acquaintance and
observation of the other would readily detect.
Id. at 742.
"1249 Miss. 247, 148 So. 2d 494 (1962). One doctor testifed that the case history
taken from the defendant might have influenced his opinion as to the defendant's sanity.
Id.
92287 So. 2d 759 (Miss. 1974).
[Vol. 1:213
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expert witnesses are not infallible. The opinion testimony of an expert
"must be based upon his study and his own experience and if either is
lacking, deficient or immature, his conclusions may fall short of the
accuracy essential to a true verdict.-6 3 On the basis of the evidence of
the circumstances of the act and the conduct of the defendant, the
jurors using "common sense or. . . applying the lessons of human ex-
perience,"4 may form their own opinion as to the defendant's
sanity."
The right and duty of the jury to determine the credibility of and
the weight to given testimony should not be a license to arbitrarily ig-
nore expert opinion.6 6 The supreme court in Lias said that an ar-
bitrary verdict should be reversed. The expert opinion was clear, un-
equivocal, and uncontradicted in the Lias case.
The diagnosis of the defendant was not the opinion of one man
hired by the defendant, but rather the unanimous opinion of the entire
psychiatric staff at a state mental institution. There could be no sug-
gestion of bias on the part of the experts. Certainly with nearly three
years of observing and treating the defendant, the experts had suffi-
cient facts on which to base a diagnosis,66 and that diagnosis deserved
to be given substantial weight in the jury's decision.
In the face of such convincing, unchallenged, and undoubtedly
valid expert testimony, the jury's finding of sanity should have been
found by the Mississippi Supreme Court to be arbitrary and against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
PART TWO
Mr. Chief Justice Patterson in his concurring opinion recognized
the dilemma of the jury and the court. He concluded that no clear
provision is made in statute or case law for the criminal commitment
of defendants like Lias. If the Mississippi Code66 allowed the jury to
certify that an acquitted defendant was insane or dangerous to the
community, Lias could have been committed by the jury's certificate
without further hearing.76 The chief justice recognized that "[I1t is
very unlikely that a jury by its verdict would return a multiple killer
to the streets even though criminal intention to commit the act was
absent." 7
:Id. at 762.
'Smith v. State, 245 So. 2d 583, 595 (1971).
."Id. See Saucier v. State, 328 So. 2d 355 (1976).
'United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1971).
"362 So. 2d at 201. Record, vol. 1 at 16, 17.
:'See note 41 supra.
,:MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-13-7 (1972). supra note 10.
0Id.
"362 So. 2d at 202 (concurring opinion).
19791
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The reluctance of a jury in a case like this to find the defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity is best understood in terms of an ap-
prehension that if loosed the defendant will commit further acts of
violence. A study of juries by the University of Chicago Law School
showed that in every case the jury considered the likely disposition of
the defendant.7 2 The study further showed that jurors who had
originally favored a finding of insanity were often persuaded to vote
for the guilty verdict rather than allow the defendant to be released.1
3
The instructions on the verdicts, the jury in the Lias case could
have rendered, offered "no realistic alternative to a verdict other than
murder.""4 The jury could find the defendant guilty; not guilty; not
guilty by reason of insanity and certify that he was dangerous because
still insane; or not guilty by reason of insanity and certify that he has
since been restored to his reason.7" Since the defendant had in-
disputably killed those persons he was charged with murdering7 and
since he was indisputably sane at the time of the trial,77 the jury had
only two options: convict Lias or let him go "scot free." With the op-
tions given them and their legitimate concern for the community, the
jurors' verdict is not surprising.
CONCLUSION
The law promises that persons who act without criminal intent
and who are not morally blameworthy shall not be punished for acts
that are otherwise criminal. The holding of Cunningham"8 promises
that the burden of proof is upon the prosecution as to an accused's
sanity. For these promises to have much practical meaning in cases
such as the present one, the law must either allay the fears of the jury
by providing for the commitment of defendants like Frankie Lee Lias
or must show an increased willingness to overturn convictions where
a reasonable doubt of the accused's sanity exists.
The criminal commitment procedures in Mississippi have been
rendered inadequate because of medical advances in the treatment of
mental illness. The statutes appear to be based on the assumption that
mental illness, severe enough to excuse an accused, will be of a more
or less permanent nature. The apparently successful treatment of
Lias illustrates that this assumption may no longer be valid. Several
options are available and the legislature might choose to adopt pro-
"2 Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 TEMP. L. Q. 235, 247 (1956).
7Id.
"362 So. 2d at 202 (concurring opinion).
SId.





cedures in effect in other jurisdictions or develop new ones to cope
with defendants who have been restored to their sanity but never-
theless pose a potential hazard to their communities.
The Mississippi Legislature could provide for the mandatory com-
mitment of any defendant acquitted by reason of insanity.78 To be
sure that such procedure could withstand a challenge on due process
grounds, a procedure for review following commitment should also
be enacted.80 Another option would be to grant discretionary power
to trial judges to commit defendants following acquittal.8 The
Mississippi Legislature could simply amend the present code section
to allow juries to commit defendants who are certified as being insane
or dangerous.
Another option would be the adoption of a procedure analogous to
the one set forth in Brown v. Jaquith.8 2 In that case it was held that a
circuit court had power to refer a defendant found incompetent to
stand trial to the chancery court for civil commitment proceedings.
The affidavit of the court would be accepted in lieu of the certificate
required by Section 41-21-65 of the Mississippi Code. A procedure
could easily be established by the legislature or the supreme court for
such a referral of an acquitted defendant. The commitment of per-
sons who are not insane raises questions as grave as those raised by
punishment of persons acting without criminal intent. The legislature
may have to eventually develop alternatives not involving incarcera-
tion as the medical profession becomes more successful in treating
grave mental illness. A system providing for closely supervised
maintenance of persons like Lias on an outpatient basis might in the
future become feasible. Such a system would be commendable in that
both the freedom of the individual and the safety of the community
would not be greatly impaired.
In addition to statutory reforms to provide more realistic alter-
natives for courts and juries, consideration should be given to adopt-
ing a more meaningful standard of review of jury verdicts. One
standard for review of jury verdicts exists for all criminal cases: a
jury's determination will not be overturned unless it is clearly ar-
bitrary, the product of prejudice or passion or against the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence.8 3 The standard has been unquestioned.
However, when the consideration of what will likely happen to a
"See, NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.521 (1977).
"See, DEL. CODE ANN. I I § 403(b) (1974). See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, (1972). (Indefinite commitment for incompetency to stand trial without
safeguards provided in civil commitment proceedings was a denial of equal protection
of the laws).
"ARK. STAT. 1947 § 41-612 (1977 Replacement).
"318 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1975).
"Simmons v. State 301 So. 2d 565, (Miss. 1974); Campbell v. State, 278 So. 2d 420
(Miss. 1973).
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defendant is preliminary to deciding the issue of his sanity, a jury's
determination of an accused's sanity does not merit being given such
overwhelming weight by an appellate court. 84  The announced
standard of review in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, if adopted by
the Mississippi Supreme Court, could make appellate review more
meaningful. Under that standard an appellate court would reverse
convictions where "reasonable doubt must have existed in the minds
of reasonable jurors"85 as to the accused's legal sanity.
Judge Bazelon, in paraphrasing La Rouchefoucauld, could have
been summarizing the state of the law on the insanity defense in
Mississippi when he said "[Tihe law like the rest of us 'promises ac-
cording to [its] hopes' but perform[s] according to [its] fears. '"8" Cun-
ningham declared the law's hope and its promise. Lias illustrates
how in fear the law fails to live up to its promise.
D. Elizabeth Featherston
"29 TEMP. L. Q. 235, 247 (1956).
"Nagell v. United States, 392 F.2d 934, (5th Cir. 1968).
"Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 389. From LA
ROUCHEFOUCAULD, MAXMES, 61 (F. C. Green ed. 1945).
[Vol. 1:213
